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Abstract: 
The paper introduces an approach to privacy enhancing technologies that sees 
privacy not merely as an individual right, but as a public good. This 
understanding of privacy has recently gained ground in the debate on 
appropriate legal protection for privacy in an online environment. The 
jurisprudential idea that privacy is a public good and prerequisite for a 
functioning democracy also entails that its protection should not be left 
exclusively to the individual whose privacy is infringed. This idea finds its 
correspondence in our approach to privacy protection through obfuscation, 
where everybody in a group takes a small privacy risk to protect the anonymity 
of fellow group members. We show how these ideas can be computationally 
realised in an Investigative Data Acquisition Platform (IDAP). IDAP is an 
efficient symmetric Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocol optimised for 
the specific purpose of facilitating public authorities’ enquiries for evidence. 
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Introduction 
This paper discusses the technology for an obfuscation based method for 
privacy enhancing tools, which serves the dual function of protection the 
reputation and privacy of data subjects while at the same time offering some 
advantages for police investigators. Unlike most other approaches to Privacy 
Enhancing Technologies (PET), in our model for an “Investigative Data 
Acquisition Platform” the protection of privacy is seen as a communal task, 
something that we call for reasons that will become apparent below the 
“Spartacus model” of data protection. This approach requires us however to 
reconsider not just the doctrinal legal environmental of privacy and data 
protection law, but also its jurisprudential, ethical and sociological 
underpinnings. Most approaches to PET reflect the individualistic, libertarian 
origins of privacy law as an individual right. By contrast, our approach asks 
how PET can look like in a society that considers the protection of privacy a 
communal task, and understanding of privacy law that has recently gained 
much ground in the academic debate. In the first part of the paper, we 
therefore describe the motivation for this approach in the form of an extended 
use case, which allows us to give an informal outline of the solution suggested 
here. This will prepare the ground for a first legal-jurisprudential analysis that 
is needed for the normative underpinning of the technology. In the second 
part, we introduce the formal apparatus necessary for the type of communal 
privacy protection that was described so far. In the third part, we provide a 
short evaluation of the results, both from a technological and from a legal and 
ethical perspective, indicating also a number of necessary further research 
questions, in particular empirical and socio-legal questions regarding common 
perception of privacy and risks.  
 
1.1 Setting the scene: Obfuscation and privacy protection  
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Consider as a setting for the discussion in this paper the following example of 
a traditional, brick and mortar police investigation: The police wants to check 
the alibi of a suspect, John Doe. They drive in a marked police car to his place 
of residence, park it in full view on the street next to his house, and then send 
pairs of uniformed police officers from neighbour to neighbour, asking if they 
saw Mr Doe at his home during a certain time interval.  
This sort of scenario carries two obvious risks: one is a reputation risk for Mr 
Doe. His neighbours now know at the very least that he is for one reason or 
the other suspected of a wrongdoing.  They might also be able to infer from 
the question some of the information the police holds about Mr Doe – if for 
instance they are asked for a specific time interval, and it is well known that 
during that time a robbery happened nearby, it would be obvious to infer that 
Mr Doe is suspect in a robbery. If the question is: “Have you ever seen very 
young girls visiting your neighbour late at night”, another inference would 
immediately be drawn.  
At the same time, this approach also carries risks for the police – the 
neighbours may inadvertently or intentionally alert Mr  Doe that he is subject 
to a police investigation. One way to protect both the interest of Mr Doe in 
preventing the disclosure of information about him (here, that he is subject to 
a police inquiry) and the interest of the police not to alert Mr Doe is to ask 
questions that are much border phrased, for instance asking every neighbour, 
including Mr Doe, to list everybody whom they saw in the neighbourhood at 
the relevant time. This way, there is no finger of suspicion that points at one 
specific person, but this strategy carries obvious costs too. It creates much 
more information than necessary, most of it noise, which the police then has 
to process. It also creates a privacy risk for a much larger number of people – 
the police now knows about the whereabouts of a large number of people it 
has no legitimate interests in. Nonetheless, creating an excess amount of 
information seems, paradoxically, to be one way of protecting privacy and 
integrity of the investigation   
We can now transfer this scenario to the internet, for instance a request to an 
ISP for data that establishes when a suspect was online, or a request to a 
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bank about online transactions carried out by a client.  At this point, we face 
the same dilemma as described above – the formal request for information 
discloses to the data controller that the police has a legitimate interest in one 
of their clients. This in turn might give the data controller an incentive for 
action. A bank for instance may decide to disassociate themselves from a 
client who has been frequently the subject for data discloser requests, on the 
assumption that he carries a risk for reputation damage should he become 
subject of a high profile trial. This in turn may alert the client to investigative 
activities against him. Concerns about cybercrime and terrorism has resulted 
in a considerable extension of data retention duties by internet service 
providers, which add to the already significant data online retailers, banks or 
social media providers hold about their clients. For the purpose of criminal 
investigations, channels have been created that allow the police under certain 
circumstances, defined in law, to demand access. In the aftermath of 2001, 
public authorities were granted much  wider rights to gather operational data 
(Swire & Steinfeld, 2002; Young, Kathleen, Joshua, & Meredith, 2006). For a 
number of years public opinion accepted privacy intrusions as the sacrifice 
everybody must make. However, slowly the public opinion is shifting back to 
the state were intrusion of privacy is considered as unacceptable. This is 
shown by different surveys such as the one conducted by Washington Post in 
2006 (Balz & Deane, 2006), where 32% of respondents agreed that they 
would prefer federal government to ensure that privacy rights are respected 
rather than to investigate possible terrorist threats. This was 11% increase 
from the similar survey conducted in 2003. However, while this indicates a 
general societal willingness “to do something” about privacy during police 
investigations, the “obfuscation” method described above – asking much 
wider, less focussed questions – can’t easily be transferred to  an online 
environment.  The formal procedure that is required to gain data access 
requires that the query is sufficiently precise and focussed, to prevent 
authorities from looking around for any collateral evidence of an arbitrary 
offence and unnecessary privacy intrusions of innocent citizens. In Europe, 
the Data Protection Directive allows national police forces access to data only 
“in specific cases.” As Bignami (2007) noted, this provision is explicitly 
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designed to prohibit high-tech fishing expeditions, in line with the generally 
much more sceptical attitude in Europe to data mining, whether done by the 
police or by market actors. Again Bignami:  
“The police cannot make blanket requests for calling information. 
Rather, they must compile detailed requests for information on specific 
telephone numbers. The requirement of specificity is a means of 
guaranteeing that the police have at least some grounds for suspecting 
those telephone numbers of being involved in a criminal conspiracy.” 
Paradoxically therefore, a method that could in principal protect citizens from 
the misuse of their data prohibits certain privacy enhancing methods.  
Nonetheless, using obfuscation is an attractive privacy enhancing tool in 
principle. In the online scenario, it is the protection of the interests of third 
parties that prevents us to hide the identity of Mr Doe behind a veil of “excess 
data”. This however would change of a sufficient number of other clients of 
the company in question waived their rights, and under the assumption of 
mutuality and reciprocity provide the “fog” of data that shields the identity of 
the subject of a data query from the data controller, though not the police. The 
bank or ISP will in this model only know that the subject of the query is 
amongst the arbitrarily large number of records they are asked to hand over to 
the police. The police in turn must only able to read amongst all the data 
handed over to them the data of the person they are interested in. We will see 
below how a combination of a trusted third party approach together with 
encryption methods can provide just such a set up.   
A particularly intuitive example of such a solidarity based protection of Identity 
against a data query though comes from the film “Spartacus”. In one of the 
most climatic scenes of the film, a Roman general  demands from the 
captured remains of the former slave army that they turn Spartacus over to 
him.  To protect his friends, Spartacus stands up and says "I am Spartacus." 
However, the solidarity of his soldiers is so great that several of them come 
forward, shouting "I am Spartacus!" until the shouts dissolve into a cacophony 
of thousands of former slaves each claiming  "I am Spartacus!". Unable to 
identify Spartacus, the general is forced to act against all of them, crucifying 
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them along the road to Rome.  This is admittedly not an ideal end to illustrate 
the underlying idea of our solidarity based approach to privacy protection. It 
does however point to one of the main issues that technology alone cannot 
tackle – the legal and social environment necessary for such an approach to 
work. Enlightened self-interest plays a role, and the model assumes 
reciprocity: I’m willing to accept a (very low) privacy risk to myself when 
making my data available as “fog”, but I know that should I ever be at the 
centre of an investigation, others will do the same for me. However, as a 
motivation this may be insufficient, as many people will not consider it likely to 
come in such a way to the attention of the law enforcement agencies. As the 
Spartacus example shows, people are sometimes willing to take personal 
risks for a communal good.  This requires us however to reconsider the 
normative foundations of privacy law.  
1.2 Privacy as a public good and a public responsibility 
Privacy has traditionally been framed in law as a paradigmatic case of an 
individual right that pitches the self-interest of individual against the communal 
interest of the state. This is a feature it shares with a traditional understanding 
of human rights law as individual rights that protect against state action only. 
To a degree, we can read this even from the etymology of the word. “Privacy” 
is derived from the Latin “privare” – to rob or to deprive. Our private time was 
for the ever egregious Romans the time when we robbed our friends from the 
pleasure of our company, and the time we deprived the state of our service. 
This perception remains to a degree with us today. Privacy is in public 
discourse often portrayed as ultimately selfish, and in the age of social media 
if not anti-social, ten at least a-social. Only recently, an alternative discourse 
in human rights scholarship has emerged, whichportraits privacy itself as a 
social or public value on which other important public goods, in particular 
democracy and public participation, rests. Privacy enables individuals to 
criticise and resist measures or acts of government that are of an 
undemocratic or even totalitarian nature. It has therefore been suggested that 
privacy is necessary to protect individuals from the pressure to conform to 
societal expectations in a way that poses a threat not only to human dignity 
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and a person’s individuality, but also to the liberty that flows from it. Equally, 
Simitis (1984 p.399) argued forcefully that even tough privacy has often been 
misunderstood as conflicting with transparency, free speech and other 
democracy enhancing  concepts, its role in fostering participation musty not 
been overlooked.  Even earlier, Bloustein  (1964 p1003) argued that 
“[t]he man who is compelled to live every minute of his life 
among others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy 
or gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived 
of his individuality and human dignity. Such an individual 
merges with the mass. His opinions, being public, tend never 
to be different; his aspirations, being known, tend always to 
be conventionally accepted ones; his feelings, being openly 
exhibited, tend to lose their quality of unique personal warmth 
and to become the feelings of every man.  
And indeed, the experience in many totalitarian regimes has shown that an 
absence of privacy has the potential for creating a “society of followers”.  
This interdependency between the protection of privacy and the protection of 
other essential features of a democratic society is also highlighted by Raab 
(2011) who argues that values like personal autonomy and self-determination 
“are important not primarily because individuals may wish to 
live in isolation (for they do not, mostly), but so that they can 
participate in social and political relationships at various levels 
of scale, and so that they can undertake projects and pursue 
their own goals”. 
While this shift towards a recognition of privacy as a public good is welcome, 
for our purpose it has the problem that much of the reassessment also 
resulted in questioning the role of consent and privacy waivers. As long as   
privacy was seen   merely an individual right, governments found it easy to 
convince individuals of the legitimacy of a privacy-security trade-off. Similarly, 
free social media services such as facebook offer essentially a “trade in” 
between privacy and free use of services, paid for by advertising revenue. 
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This turned privacy into a tradable object under the control of the rights 
holder, and marginalised the concept of  “privacy risk”. How valuable is 
privacy if so many people are willing to trade it in for mere pennies in 
discounts when shopping with a loyalty card, or hit points in an online game? 
Just as privacy became in this model private property, so did privacy risks, 
which were conceptualised  as  only one of a number of competing risks and 
benefits such as fear of  crime,  loss of convenience2 or loss of material gain. 
Theories that emphasise the value of privacy as a common good therefore 
also became sceptical of the notion of free alienation of privacy in market 
places, and with that role of individual consent.  As Regan  (1995 p. 233)  
argues, there is a risk that  
“[i]f one individual or a group of individuals waives privacy 
rights, the level of privacy for all individuals decreases 
because the value of privacy [in the collective view of society] 
decreases”. 
Or put differently, in a society where “Big Brother” is daytime television and 
everybody shares their feelings on facebook or twitter, refusing to participate 
in the sharing of data is at best mildly odd and asocial, at worst in itself 
suspicious.  In   an administrative or law enforcement context, this means that 
an already existing “information imbalance” between citizens and the state is 
further shifted in the state’s favour. We have to be careful therefore that our 
won consent based approach, which is crucially dependent on the legal 
conceptualisation of privacy as a common good, does not inadvertently 
undermine this very notion of solidarity. Technology, institutional 
arrangements and law all play an important role in this balancing act.  
These preliminary jurisprudential reflections provide us with an abstract 
normative framework for the technological solution to the protection of privacy 
for people caught for whatever reasons on the police radar during an 
investigation.  It assumes that the protection of privacy is not just a task for 
the individual, but a communal concern, based on solidarity and not (just) self-
interest. The aim is a solution where through solidarity in a community, the 
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identity of a suspect is to be protected without interfering with legitimate police 
interests. This requires reassurances, technological, institutional and legal, for 
those people who are willing to assist in the protection of each other’s privacy.  
In the next section, we introduce our proposal for a “Data Acquisition 
Platform” (IDAP), focussing mainly on the first aspect, how the necessary trust 
can be created that allows actions of solidarity.  
2 Introducing IDAP 
2.1 BACKGROUNG AND RELATED WORK 
Leaving the investigative context aside, the retrieval of information from a 
third-party in a private manner is a generic problem that has been researched 
for use in a variety of different scenarios. The things an individual searches for 
disclose potentially a lot about this individual, which is after all the central part 
of Google’s business model.  Initially, concepts referred to as Private 
Information Retrieval (PIR) protocols were designed with a basic requirement 
of acquiring an interesting data record, or just a specific data bit, from a 
dataholder, sender, in a way that this dataholder is unable to judge which 
record is of interest to the requestor, chooser. These protocols were not 
concerned with the secrecy of the records stored in the database, thus in its 
least optimised state a PIR could have been achieved by transferring the 
whole database from the sender to the chooser, as this would allow the 
chooser to retrieve a record in a private manner. To use a very simple 
analogy, if an individual wants to browse the offerings of an online retailer of 
medical self-help books, but do not want to leave a trail that indicates to the 
retailer unnecessarily which illness the individual may suffer from, 
downloading the catalogue in pdf and searching it on a private device has 
advantages over online browsing. There are no privacy concerns on the side 
of the retailer in this case, as all the information is public anyway.  
Consequently, the main motivation behind the PIR schemes is achievement of 
a minimal communicational and computational complexity (Ostrovsky & 
William E. Skeith III, 2007). A stronger notion than PIR is 1-out-of-n Oblivious 
Transfer (OT) primitive that allows the retrieval of a randomly selected record 
from the dataset of n elements held by the sender in a way that the sender 
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cannot learn which record has been transferred, and the chooser cannot learn 
anything about other records in the dataset (Schneier, 1995). 1-out-of-n OT 
protocols that allow chooser to actively select a record to be retrieved, and 
that have linear or sub-linear complexity, can be referred to as symmetric PIR 
(SPIR) protocols, since they protect the records of both parties during the 
information retrieval. These useful privacy-preserving data retrieval protocols 
can be employed in a variety of systems: electronic watch-lists of suspects 
(Frikken & Atallah, 2003); cooperative scientific computation (Du & Atallah, 
2001; Goldwasser & Lindell, 2002); and on-line auctions (Cachin, 1999). 
Frikken’s and Atallah’s approach deserves some further comments, as it 
shares some of the technological solutions with our proposal, but due to a 
very different legal-ethical approach to privacy, advocates an implementation 
that acerbates rather than reduces the specific issue we want to address. A 
typical application for their solution is alerting police where a stolen credit card 
or a credit card belonging to a suspect gets used. However, if the technical 
solution was to be reused in a data retrieval scenario it could be extended to 
the following: the police have received information that some known suspects 
are planning a bomb attack, possibly using some form of fertiliser. They want 
to query the customer database of a fertiliser retailer, ideally without alerting 
the retailer on the identity of their suspects. This can have several reasons, 
including suspicions against the retailer himself. One obvious solution, in line 
with the above, would be to simply request the entire database, or data about 
everybody who bought fertiliser, and analyse it on a police server. However, 
this would mean that the police also gets hold of data about a large number of 
innocent citizens – with the fear that they might e.g. re-use the data to check it 
against tax records or other types of investigative activity perceived as 
marginal in comparison to terrorism by the population. Frikken’s and Atallah’s 
solution is to provide the police not with the entire database of the retailer, but 
a segment of it that is sufficiently large to hide their interest in a specific 
person from the retailer. To protect the wider public though, the selection of 
data is determined by an objective criterion such as a list of people with 
previous criminal records, possibly for related offences. This minimises the 
privacy risk for innocent citizens. It does however potentially increase the 
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privacy risk for people on the lists from which selection takes place 
substantially. The retailer could in this case learn that a number of his 
customers have previous records, or have come to the attention of the police 
in some other way. We can see now the different jurisprudential assumptions 
behind their model and ours: In Frikken and Atallah, privacy is a conditional 
right that can be lost through misbehaviour. This does not just apply to the 
case at hand – that is a suspect in a criminal investigation can reasonably 
suffer restrictions in his privacy to further the aims of the criminal justice 
system - but alters the legal standing of a person even in cases unrelated to 
him. Where our model is based on the voluntary solidarity between all citizens 
(whether or not they have a previous record, or are on a police watch list) , in 
their model a subset of the citizenry, those who for one reason or the other 
have already become subject to police interest, are forced to provide the 
cover for the investigation.  
 
With the use of the protocols described above, a chooser would be capable of 
privately retrieving a record from the sender’s database, by secretly referring 
to its index in this database. In SPIR such index is expected to be publically 
available in an electronic catalogue or a directory (Aiello, Ishai, & Reingold, 
2001; Bao & Deng, 2001). However, ISPs and other dataholders with large 
databases of private data cannot be expected to maintain such freely 
available indexes. Also, it is expected that an investigator would normally refer 
to a suspect by a number (name converted from a tex format to a binary 
number, ID or phone number, etc). For this reason before the data can be 
received using SPIR, a search would need to be performed by the chooser 
against the records in the sender’s database. Such a private search operation 
requires a protocol that allows two parties to compare their values in a private 
manner. The protocols that are optimised to make comparisons for equality 
are referred to as Private Equality Test (PEqT) protocols. PEqT protocols are 
often based on commutative (Frikken & Atallah, 2003; Kwecka et. al. 2008) or 
homomorphic cryptosystems (Bao & Deng, 2001).  
An interesting record can be located in a database using a 1-out-of-n PEqT 
protocol and then retrieved with help of SPIR. Often each of these protocols 
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would have a separate computationally expensive preparation phases, such 
solution would not be optimal for IDAP. The exception to this rule is a range of 
protocols including: private intersection; private intersection size; and PE 
defined in (Agrawal, Evfimievski, & Srikant, 2003). These protocols are based 
on commutative encryption and thanks to the use of different properties of the 
underlying commutative algorithms are capable of allowing for both private 
matching and private data retrieval.  
 
2.2 BUILDING BLOCKS 
This section describes the  PE protocol that is the basis for creation of the 
privacy preserving investigative platform - IDAP. The PE protocol relies on 
commutative cryptography, a thus some background for this is provided first. 
 
2.2.1 Commutative Cryptosystems 
Many cryptographic applications employ sequential encryption and decryption 
operations under one or more underlying cryptosystems. The reasons to 
sequence (cascade) different cryptographic schemes together include 
strengthening the resulting ciphertext and achieving additional functionality 
which is impossible under any given encryption scheme on its own (Shannon, 
1949; Weis, 2006). A basic cascadable cryptosystem can consist of a number 
of encryption stages, where the output from one stage is treated as an input to 
another. In such a basic cascadable cryptosystem it is necessary to decrypt in 
the reverse order of encryption operations. However, a special class of 
sequential cryptosystems - commutative cryptosystems – allows for the 
decryption of a ciphertext in an arbitrary order. Thus, a ciphertext )(meec ab  (c 
– ciphertext, m – plaintext, e – encryption operation under keys a and b), 
could be decrypted as either )(cddm ab  or as )(cddm ba . The advantages of 
such cryptosystems were widely promoted by Shamir (1980) as used in his, 
Rivest’s and Aldman’s  classic game of mental poker, employing the Three-
Pass (3Pass) secret exchange protocol.  
 The most commonly used commutative cryptosystem is based on the 
Pohling-Hellman (PH), asymmetric private key scheme (1978). This scheme 
first published in 1978 has never become popular since it is asymmetric, and 
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therefore, slow in comparison to other private key systems. While the PH 
protocol influenced the design of Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key 
scheme (1978), the main strength of PH is that it is commutative for keys 
based on the same prime number and that it allows for comparing the 
encrypted ciphertexts. Consequently, under PH the two ciphertext  )(meec abba   
and )(meec baab   hiding the same plaintext m are equal (1), while this is not the 
case with ordinary encryption protocols, that satisfy (2). 
 
)()( meemee abba   (1) 
)()( meemee abba   (2) 
 
Thanks to those properties PH can be used in the 3Pass primitive that allows 
two parties to exchange data without exchange of keys, as well as to perform 
PEqT that permits private matching of data records. 
 
2.2.2 Three Pass Protocol (3Pass) 
The 3Pass protocol, shown in Fig. 1, was intended to allow two parties to 
share a secret without exchanging any private or public key.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Three-Pass Secret Exchange Protocol. 
The protocol was aimed at providing an alternative to public-key encryption and DH-like key negotiation protocols. 
 
The operation of the protocol can be described using the following physical 
analogy: 
 
1. Alice places a secret message m in a box and locks it with a padlock 
AE . 
2. The box is sent to Bob, who adds his padlock BE  to the latch, and 
sends the box back. 
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3. Alice removes her padlock and passes the box back to Bob. 
4. Bob removes his padlock, and this enables him to read the message 
from inside the box. 
 
There could be more parties, or encryption stages, involved in a 3Pass-like 
protocol, and this property makes it ideal for locking a plaintext multiple times 
and then unlocking it in an arbitrary order, as long as the parties are 
cooperating until the execution of the protocol is completed. Such functionality 
is required by IDAP as described later in this paper. 
 
2.3 Private Equality Test (PEqT) 
PEqT protocols can be used to privately verify whether two secret inputs to 
the protocol are equal or not. Agrawal, Evfimievski and Srikant (2003) 
proposed one of the most scalable and flexible PEqT protocols for operations 
on datasets. The scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2 and can be described in the 
following steps: 
 
1. Alice encrypts her input and sends it to Bob. 
2. Bob encrypts the ciphertext received from Alice and sends it back. 
3. Bob encrypts his secret input and sends it to Alice. 
4. Alice encrypts the ciphertext containing Bob’s input. 
5. Alice compares the two resulting ciphertexts, if they are equal then her 
and Bob’s inputs are equal. 
6. Alice may inform Bob about the result. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Private Equality Test. 
Alice Bob
Alice’s input: secret input A ; encryption key AE . 
Bob’s input: secret input B ; encryption key BE . 
 
)(AEA  
))(( AEE AB  )(AEA  
))(( AEE AB  
If   ))(())(( BEEAEE BAAB   then   BA   
Secret input: 
A  
Secret input: 
B  
1 
2 
 
)(BEB  
3 ))(( BEE BA  4 
5 
6 BA   or BA   
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This protocol allows two parties to compare their secret inputs. 
 
The following section describes a scheme that extends both the PEqT and 
3Pass primitives to form the PE protocol that is the blueprint for our  IDAP.  
 
2.4 Private Equijoin Protocol 
A PE protocol can enable two parties, the chooser and the sender, to privately 
compare their sets of unique values VC and VS, and allows the chooser to 
retrieve some extra information )(vext  about records VS, that match records VC 
on a given parameter. The PE protocol involves the following steps: 
 
1. Both parties apply hash function h to the elements in their sets, so that 
)( CC VhX   and )( SS VhX  . Chooser picks a secret PH key CE  at random, 
and sender picks two PH keys SE  and SE , all from the same group *p . 
2. Chooser encrypts entries in the set: ))(()( CCCCC VhEXEY  . 
3. Chooser sends to sender set CY , reordered lexicographically. 
4. Sender encrypts each entry CYy , received from the chooser, with both 
SE  and SE  and for each returns 3-tuple )(),(, yEyEy SS  . 
5. For each SXvh )( , sender does the following: 
(a) Encrypts )(vh  with SE  for use in equality test. 
(b) Encrypts )(vh  with SE  for use as a key to lock the extra information 
about v, ))(()( vhEv S . 
(c) Encrypts the extra information )(vext : 
))(),(()( vextvKvc   
Where K is a symmetric encryption function and )(v  is the key 
crafted in Stage 5b. 
(d) Forms a pair )()),(( vcvhES . These pairs, containing a private match 
element and the encrypted extra information about record v, are 
then transferred to chooser. 
6. Chooser removes her encryption CE  from all entries in the 3-tuples 
received in Step 4 obtaining tuples α, β, and γ such that 
))(()),((),(,, vhEvhEvh SS  . Thus, α is the hashed value CVv , β is the 
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hashed value v encrypted using SE , and γ is the hashed value v 
encrypted using SE . 
7.  Chooser sets aside all pairs received in Step 5, whose first entry is 
equal to one of the β tuples obtained in Step 6. Then using the γ tuples 
as symmetric keys it decrypts the extra information contained in the 
second entry in the pair )()),(( vcvhES . 
 
The above protocol can perform the basic functions required for the purpose 
of investigative data acquisition. Its use in investigative scenarios is described 
in the following section. 
 
3 . IDAP VS. PRIVATE EQUIJOIN 
This section evaluates our proposed use of the PE protocol as basis for IDAP. 
The operations required during investigative data acquisition from a third party 
in general consist of: 
 
1. Identification of the type of the information that is required. These could 
be h parameters, that contain answers to investigator’s questions, 
referred to as return parameters rp1-k, e.g. DOB, address, location of a 
card payment, or numbers called by a given subscriber. In a formal, 
legally prescribed environment, it ought to be able to demonstrate  later 
that these criteria matched those on the warrant application, adding an 
additional level of legal scrutiny and accountability.  
2. Specification of any circumstantial request constrains, or l different 
input parameters,  
ip1-l, with values ip_val1-l, e.g. time frame of the transactions being 
requested. 
3. Specification of the relevant data subject e.g. by identifying the 
individual whose data is to be retrieved, or by providing the mobile 
phone number of the suspect, etc. This parameter is referred to as the 
record of the interest, ri with value ri_val. 
4. Retrieval of the relevant records 
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Then, if we refer to the dataset as the source, the request for investigative 
data could be mapped into the following SQL query: 
 
SELECT rp1, rp2, …, rph  
FROM source             (
WHERE ri=ri_val AND ip1=ip_val1 AND ip2=ip_val2 AND … AND ipl= ip_val l 
 
In most cases the names of the return parameters, as well as the names of 
the input parameters, and values of these input parameters can be openly 
communicated. But the value of the interesting record, ri_val is used to 
uniquely identify the suspect and must be hidden. This can be achieved by 
running a database query for the return parameters of all the records that 
satisfy the conditions defined by the input parameters and then collecting the 
interesting record from the sender using a PE protocol.  Consequently, the 
query that is actually run on the sender’s database can be rewritten to: 
 
SELECT ri, rp1, rp2, …, rph  
FROM source             (
WHERE ip1=ip_val1 AND ip2=ip_val2 AND … AND ipl= ip_val l 
 
The results of such query (3) would be an input to a PE that would enable the 
chooser to privately select only the record of interest that match given ri_val.  
  
3.1 PE’s Performance 
The previous section  discussed different types of protocols available that 
could enable the chooser to download a record from the sender’s database,  
maintaining the secrecy of the record selected. We also mentioned  that most 
available protocols could not achieve IDAP on their  own, and a  combination 
of two or more protocols is required. Such combination typically results in high 
computational and communicational complexity, because each protocol 
usually requires its own preparation phase. The PE protocol described in 
Section IV is capable of both private matching and performing SPIR, and has 
a low overhead. Table I defines the computational complexity of the protocol. 
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TABLE I 
Computational Complexity of the PE protocol 
 
Symmetric 
Crypto. 
Asymmetric 
Crypto. 
crypto. 
operation 
key 
generation 
crypto. 
operation 
Step 1 - )3(O  - 
Step 2 - - )(mO  
Step 4 - - )2( mO  
Step 5 )(nO  - )2( nO  
Step 6 - - )2( mO  
Step 7 )(mO  - - 
Total Complexity )( mnO   )3(O  )25( nmO   
Cost (ms/operation) 0.33 7 30 
The complexity of each of the steps in the proposed initial solution. 
Where n is the number of the data rows in the source, and m is the 
number of interesting records. Cost is the measured average time in ms 
to perform given cryptographic operation from managed C# .NET code. 
 
In practice this particular solution based on the PH cipher and implemented in 
C# .NET can process thousand records a minute, on average. The following 
section discusses the performance in context of investigation, and discusses 
issues that could possibly limit the usability of the solution presented. 
 
3.2 Advantages of PE in data acquisition process 
Following our general  philosophy outlined in the first part,  the  PE protocol 
allows for acquiring more than one interesting record at the time, and adding 
more records to the enquiry increases the processing time by a negligible 
value (~151ms) per each extra interesting record in an enquiry. Use of the PE 
would also satisfy the condition that the dataholder remains in full control of 
data, and decides which data can be disclosed. This addresses several 
current legal concerns regarding whether or not the police should be given 
direct access to traffic  data in particular, or, as in the present system, the 
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data  controller remains in control of the data and can, if necessary, refuse the 
request and challenge its legitimacy in court.  In the EP protocol each record 
is processed separately and there are no chances of the records being mixed 
up by the privacy-preserving process. Thanks to this fact unnecessary data of 
non-suspects could be discarded on reception by the authorities and still the 
encrypted interesting records received would form valid evidence for use in a 
court of law. The costs involved in building and deploying PE based IDAP are 
anticipated to be low since it is a software system and the architecture is 
based on a protocol that is in the public domain.   
   
 
3.3 Disadvantages of PE in data acquisition process 
The processing time required for the protocol to run is the main drawback of 
the PE protocol. If there are  a thousand records in the database it only takes 
approximately  one minute for the complete run of the protocol, however, the 
processing time is linear to the number of records in a dataset and data 
acquisition from a database with five million records would take three and a 
half days to run on an ordinary PC.  During an urgent enquiry, especially 
where there is a clear danger to life,  the police can currently get access to 
relevant location data from a mobile network operator in less than half an 
hour. Such a result could not be expected of PE if the database has more 
than thirty thousand records. Additionally, even if the data requested is 
relatively small in size, e.g. 100kB per record, the results from a database of 
five million records would be more thank 500MB of data that would need to be 
transferred over the Internet. Clearly, there is a requirement for the PE to run 
on a subset of the sender’s database rather than the whole database or 
another solution would need to be chosen. The first approach is described 
further below. 
 The more serious problem is that PE alone does not solve the issues that 
we discussed in the introduction.  A PE based system would work reasonable 
well  in those situations where the issue is merely the  secure matching of a 
single value per record, e.g. an  IP address, name or a credit card number. In 
some scenarios it may however be necessary  to request records based on a 
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number of secret input parameters. Consider a  scenario where  the police  
has a profile of a suspect based on a complex investigative hypothesis about 
a planned terrorist attack, for instance the simultaneous kidnapping of key 
politicians and other high profile targets.   This investigative hypothesis 
provides the investigators with a number of search parameters even if they do 
not yet have a specific theory about any individual in the terrorist group. This 
could be  for instance people who showed a particular interest in the diaries of 
possible targets, provided that they don’t have a profile that makes such an 
interest plausible. When  matching now   this profile against people working in 
certain organizations, information about this investigative hypothesis  could be 
deduced by  those organisation, which  may harm both  the investigation and 
also entire groups of people that  match the profile.. For example if the case 
being investigated has the potential to create public tension, disclosing 
through the search parameters  that  the suspect’s profile matched individuals 
in a local minority could  have serious consequences to the members of this 
minority if it is leaked the press that the police interests are going in that 
direction. Alternatively, the data holder may learn more about current thinking 
of the police on how to make effective bombs, or who the police thinks 
possible targets could be.  IDAP should be able to assist the police in such a 
scenario by hiding the search parameters form the data holder,  thus some 
modifications that need to be introduced to the protocol are proposed in the 
next section. 
  
 
4. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS 
The previous section has listed the drawbacks of using PE in the pursuit of 
IDAP. Here these drawbacks are addressed by two  correcting measures that 
modify the PE protocol for the specific purpose of investigative data 
acquisition. 
 
4.1  Lowering Processing Time 
Above we  recommended minimising the processing time required for each 
run of the protocol in large databases, such as those belonging to ISPs and 
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mobile telephony providers. Theoretically, in order to maintain privacy of the 
suspect, the chooser needs to request from the sender to process all the 
records in the database. Only this way no information about interesting record 
is revealed and the correctness of this scheme can be proven under the 
requirements of the multiparty computation (Asonov & Freytag, 2003). In its 
current form the system would not be capable of processing any urgent 
requests due to the processing time required, and this would be a major 
drawback. The mitigation for this could be to limit the numbers of records that 
needs to be processed and then sent by the sender per enquiry. Privacy of 
the alleged suspect should be protected, but if the probability of the sender 
guessing the ID of the interesting record is for example 1:1000 and not 1:n, 
and the dataholder has no other information that could help infer any 
knowledge as to the identity of the suspect, then this research argues that the 
privacy of the suspect and the investigation  is maintained. As we discussed 
above, also  during traditional, i.e. face-to-face, information gathering diffusion 
is used - hiding the suspect’s identity by asking open-ended questions about a 
larger group of individuals rather than about a single person. As we noted, this 
this is a widely accepted technique would however in a digitalised 
environment fall foul of the prohibition of fishing  expeditions with a wide net. 
We are therefore from a legal perspective required to balance various 
conflicting – and sometimes converging -  interests. The interests of the police 
in a speedy investigation converge with those of other data subjects that he 
police should only receive the minimal amount of data necessary – this point 
to a solution that limits the number of “camouflage records” that they receive.  
From the perceptive of the suspect, it matters just how detrimental an 
inference would be drawn by the mere fact of being the suspect of a criminal 
investigation. Thirdly, the nature of the data is also relevant. In an 
investigation against a suspected paedophile for instance, even otherwise 
innocent behaviour like browsing catalogues for children wear can be indirect 
evidence for the police case. In this case, the suspicion of being a paedophile 
would be particularly severe on an innocent   suspect.  At the same time, the 
mere fact that someone was looking at clothing catalogues is not particularly 
sensitive data  outside the context of such an investigation, after all, amazon’s 
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recommender system will make use of it.  Therefore, the  customers of the 
online retailer who are asked to provide “camouflage” for or suspect do not 
risk anything even if the data were compromised. In this scenario, it seems 
reasonable to increase the number of foils. However, if the data is sensitive 
regardless of whether or  not it is analysed in the context of an investigation, 
for instance information about buying Viagra, then the number of foils should 
be reduced to minimise the risk for them as  third parties. In both situations, 
another parameter would be the speed with which the police needs the 
information Our approach allows to “scale” the protection of both  the suspect 
and that  of the other customers, taking this type of legally required balancing 
as a starting point.   
    
The problem is to decide on the technique of narrowing down the scope in a 
way that ensures interesting records are among the results returned. If the list 
of the record identifiers is public, such as the list of the Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses or telephone numbers served by a given network operator, then 
the chooser could simply selected records to be processed at random from 
such directory. However, in case such list is not publicly available it would be 
possible to split the PE protocol back into separate parts: PEqT; and OT, and 
an additional off-line preparation phase. This way the initial off-line phase 
could be run against the whole database but the information retrieval would 
be performed against a smaller set of records. If as a number of records 
requested per each interesting record is defined as the diluting factor - o the 
protocol IDAP would be defined as follows: 
 
Phase A - Preparation 
1.  Sender applies hash function h to the elements in the input set VS, so 
that )( SS VhX  .  
2. Sender picks a encryption PH key SE  at random from a group *p , 
where p is a strong prime. 
3. Sender encrypts each SXvh )(  with the key SE , the result is a list of 
encrypted identities ))(()( SSSSS VhEXEY   
If more record needs to be added to the set these can be processes using 
steps 1 and 3, and then added to the list. 
 
Phase B - PEqT 
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1. Following a request for data, sender provides chooser with a complete 
list of encrypted identities prepared during Phase A, reordered 
lexicographically. 
2. Chooser applies hash function h to the elements in set containing the 
identities of the interesting records, so that )( CC VhX  .  
3. Chooser picks a commutative cryptography key pair, encryption key CE  
and decryption key CD , at random from the same group *p  that was 
used by sender in the Phase A. 
4. Chooser encrypts entries in the set XC, so that: ))(()( CCCCC VhEXEY  . 
5. Chooser sends to sender set CY , reordered lexicographically. 
6. Sender encrypts with key SE  each entry CYy  received from chooser. 
7. Sender returns set of pairs )(, yEy S  to chooser. 
8. Chooser decrypts each entry in )( CS YE , obtaining  
)())(()( CSCCCSCCS YEDXEEDXE  .  
9. Chooser compares each entry in )( CS XE  to the entries of SY  received in 
the Step B1 (Step 1 of Phase B). This way the interesting records can 
be identified. 
 
Phase C - OT 
1. After identifying the interesting records in SY  the chooser selects at 
random 1o  other unique records from SY  for each interesting record in 
CV . These are the diluting records, that together with the records of 
interest form a shortlist for the enquiry . If the number of interesting 
records multiplied by o is greater than n, the size of the dataset VS, 
then the complete SY  is shortlisted.  
2. Send the shortlist to sender. 
3. Sender picks an encryption PH key SE  at random from the group *p . 
4. Sender identifies entries )(vh  from SX  that have been shortlisted and 
processes each shortlisted record in the following way: 
(a) Encrypts )(vh  with SE  to form the key used to lock the extra 
information about v, i.e. )(vext , ))(()( vhEv S . 
(b) Encrypts the extra information using a symmetric encryption 
function K and the key )(v  crafted in the previous step: 
))(),(()( vextvKvc   
(c) Forms a pair )()),(( vcvhES .  
5. The pairs formed in C4(c), containing a private match element and the 
encrypted extra information about record v, are then transferred to 
chooser. 
6. Sender encrypts each entry CYy , received from chooser in Step B5, 
with key SE  to form set of pairs )(, yEy S  
7. Pairs )(, yEy S  are then transferred to chooser. 
8. Chooser removes the encryption CE  from all entries in the 2-tuples 
received in Step C7 obtaining tuples α, β such that ))((),(, vhEvh S . 
Thus, α is the hashed value CVv , and β is the hashed value v 
encrypted using SE . 
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9.  Chooser sets aside all pairs received in Step C5, whose first entry is 
equal to one of the first entry of any two-tuples obtained in Step B9. 
Then uses the appropriate β tuple associated with a given interesting 
record as a symmetric key to decrypt the extra information contained in 
the second entry in the pair received in C5. This is performed for all the 
matching entries. 
 
In this improved protocol the initial processing depends on the size of the 
dataset - n, but it needs to be performed only once in a given period of time, 
e.g. once par month, or per year. The remaining operations are less 
processing savvy as illustrated in Table II. 
 
TABLE II 
Computational Complexity of Improvement 1 
 Symmetric 
Crypto. 
Asymmetric Crypto 
crypto. 
operation 
key 
generation 
crypto. 
operation 
Phase A 
(run periodically) 
Step 1 - - - 
Step 2 - )1(O  - 
Step 3 - - )(nO  
Phase B 
(run per enquiry) 
Step 3 - )1(O  - 
Step 4 - - )(mO  
Step 6 - - )(mO  
Step 8  - )(mO  
Phase C 
(run per enquiry) 
Step 3 - )1(O  - 
Step 4(a) - - )( omO   
Step 4(b) )( omO   - - 
Step 6 - - )(mO  
Step 8 - - )(mO  
Step 9 )(mO  - - 
Total Complexity for k enquiries, where omn   ))1(( okmO  )12( kO  ))5(( nokmO 
Cost (ms/operation) 0.33 7 30 
The complexity of each of the steps in the proposed improved solution. Where n is the number of the data 
rows in the source, m is the number of interesting records. Also the diluting factor o, as well as the number of 
the protocol runs k affect the processing time required by the protocol. Cost is the measured average time in 
ms to perform given cryptographic operation from managed C# .NET code. 
 
Fig. 3 illustrates the processes involved in this improved version of acquisition 
protocol. It is worth noting that there are  only five communication rounds 
required in this protocol. This is two rounds more than in the original PE 
protocol, still, most of efficient SPIR protocols require considerably more 
rounds. This method provides significant improvements to the processing time 
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required for enquiries if total number of records in the sender’s database is 
higher than mo , i.e. higher than the number of interesting records m 
multiplied by the diluting factor o. This is illustrated in Fig. 4. Furthermore, the 
true strength of this version of the protocol is seen when multiple enquiries are 
run of the same database using a single encrypted catalogue of the records, 
compiled by the sender in Phase 1 (shown in Fig. 5). 
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Fig. 3 IDAP Process Flow 
Graphical representation of the improved IDAP 
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Fig. 4 Processing time per enquiry depending on the number of interesting records 
This proposed modification of the protocol improves significantly the processing time required for the 
protocol to run for the cases where the product of the number of the interesting records m and diluting 
factor o is smaller that the number of the records in the database n. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Processing time depending on the number of enquires 
This proposed modification improves significantly the processing time required for the protocol to run for the 
cases where more than one enquiry is run against the same database. 
 
4.4  Allow multiple selection criteria 
The PE protocol can be used to privately retrieve data if the data is identified 
by a single parameter, such as ID number, credit card number, IP address, 
etc. However, this is not always the case. Consequently, if IDAP is used to 
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find a suspect based on circumstantial knowledge, or a suspect’s profile,  the 
PE protocol would need to be modified. Query (4) shows the way the request 
(3) would be modified for such enquiry, here sip1-j stand for j secret input 
parameters: 
 
SELECT sip1, sip2, …, sipj, rp1, rp2, …, rph  
FROM source (4) 
WHERE ip1=ip_val1 AND ip2=ip_val2 AND … AND ipl=ip_vall 
 
A computationally expensive solution to this problem has been published by 
Kwecka, Buchanan, and Spiers (2010). The authors suggest that symmetric 
encryption should be used to lock the return parameters and the symmetric 
keys should be secured with relevant commutative encryption keys that are 
unique to each value of the secret input parameter returned for the given row. 
Despite being computationally expensive, this solution has a unique benefit of 
allowing semi-fuzzy matching of the results if the underlying commutative 
protocol is ElGamal-based. 
 In this paper  a simplified approach is proposed. Since the query (4) 
replaces the ri parameter with j different sip parameters, the list of these j 
parameters could be used as a complex ri in the improved IDAP protocol. 
Thus, in Steps B2 and A1 a list of all values of given sip parameters would be 
hashed together to form records in sets VC and VS. This way the security of 
the protocol nor its complexity is affected by this improvement.  
 
5.  Back to the beginning:  Reassuring and incentivising the Public  
 
 
In this final section we return to our discussion from  the beginning and 
evaluate the wider legal and societal issues that this proposal raises, 
recommending two institutional aspects to complement the technological 
solutions described above. Let us recap quickly the main features of the 
system that we have described  above. The police is interested in our target, 
John Doe. It makes a request for data about Doe to the online provider X. 
Since X does not need to know the identity of the suspect, and may draw 
adverse  inferences about him if he knew that the customer was target of an 
investigation, the police requests data from a larger set of people, chosen 
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randomly. Since the retailer knows that all but one of the people whose 
information he hands over is the suspect, no adverse inference is any longer 
possible; the community hides effectively the identity of the suspect from the 
retailer. At the same time, the data of all the customers is encrypted n such a 
way that the police can only make sense of the data that belongs to the 
suspect – a key has been created prior to making the data request that open 
only that data for the specific subject under investigation. The encryption 
render the records unusable to the authorities in the sense that they are   
secure against attacks in polynomial time. This prevents “fishing expeditions, 
and ensures that the data of the innocent customers can’t be used by the 
police for other purposes.  
However, this still involves providing government agencies with, be it  
encrypted,  records of individuals that are “innocent bystanders”, and the 
public may worry that the government organisations have enough computing 
power to break the encryption used in IDAP – if not now, then at some future 
point in time.  There are few actions that may reassure the public that the data 
is safe. First, if the technique for minimising the processing time (Improvement 
1) is employed the chances that investigators will retrieve encrypted records 
of a particular individual that is not a suspect are small in large datasets. 
Thus, for a dataset with n records, during investigation with m interesting 
records and the diluting factor o the probability of this event A can be defined 
as (5) 
 
mn
moAP 
 )1()(  (5) 
 
Consequently for investigation with five interesting records, with diluting factor 
of a thousand and a dataset consisting a million records, the probability of this 
event occurring during a single run of the protocol would be less than 0.5%. 
Since the runs of the protocol are independent this probability would stay the 
same. This also means that the investigators would need to first break the 
encryption key used by the sender to hide identities (Phase A), before they 
could attempt to obtain the data about a specific individual that is not a 
30 
 
suspect, otherwise the probability of the encrypted data being provided to 
them would be small. Additionally, if the identity of a data subject is never 
encrypted under the same key as the data records then investigators would 
need to successfully brute force two separate keys in order to make use of the 
retrieved encrypted records. Otherwise the information would be unintelligible. 
 Even though the encryption method chosen would make it all but 
impossible for the police to get access to the data of the “foils”, data that in 
addition in all likelihood is of no interest o anyone as was generated randomly, 
preventing the police form using this strategically,  most security professionals 
trust into a security process more than they trust in encryption. The solution 
proposed here is that  in order to reassure the public,  a semi-trusted third 
party needs to be involved and integrated into  the protocol.   The following 
modifications to the IDAP are proposed: 
 
1. All communication between chooser and sender goes through proxy. 
2. Chooser provides proxy with the identifiers of the interesting records 
encrypted by sender, ))(( vhES . This is done over a secure channel or 
with use of a 3Pass protocol once the parties are authenticated. 
3.  At the stage where data is transferred from sender in Step C4, proxy 
filters the response and discards the records that were not specified by 
chooser’s request, i.e. the records other than the ones identified in 
Step 2. 
 
The semi-trusted party should have no interest in finding out the object of the 
investigation or the content of the data records returned by the dataholder, for 
this reason it is suggested that the role of this party should be conducted by 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)i or its equivalent in other countries. 
The party that is chosen must not cooperate with the sender or the protocol 
will be broken, since simple matching exercise would reveal the identities of 
the suspects. A key concept is that the proxy has no incentives to find out the 
detail of the investigation, thus it is not going to invest in  expensive cutting -
edge decryption technology to decode the data, nor it is going to cooperate 
with the sender in order to establish the identity of the suspect. On the other 
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hand, if the need arises to verify the chooser’s requests in front of court of 
law, the proxy and the sender could work together to establish the identities of 
the records requested by the chooser, or verify that the data request by the 
police was in conformance with the warrant that was granted. This introduces 
an additional “price” for the police – in return for more secrecy vis a vis the 
data controller (the online retailer or bank) and a more efficient search, they 
are also subject to more scrutiny and transparency, as data requests are now 
necessarily lodged with a third party, who can also check of the formulation of 
the search query was law complaint.  Since the camouflage data is destroyed 
immediately after the data of the suspect is transferred to the police, the 
problem that the police might be tempted to  “store” the excess data until such 
a time that decryption technology has improved to make it after all useful for 
them  is addressed.  
If this analysis is as we believe correct, the legal question arises if data 
encrypted in such a way is still personal data for the purposes of the Data 
Protection Act. If the answer to this question is negative, then a potentially 
interesting legal argument could be constructed that combines the high level 
of security that the technology provides with the argument that privacy is a 
social good and fundamental for a free, democratic order. In this case, the 
mere abstract privacy risk of the “foils” could be deemed acceptable to 
achieve an important societal good  - and not just to protect the individual 
suspect. This in turn might make it unnecessary to require consent from those 
customers whose data is used merely to hide the identity of the suspect. Just 
as our privacy can be violated as part of a criminal investigation to further the 
public good of efficient law enforcement, so one could argue that we are also 
required to shoulder a purely abstract privacy risk to maintain the foundations 
of a democratic society – and this requires, as argued above, protection of 
privacy. Similar arguments have been made in the  past regarding medical 
research data and “benefit sharing”: as long as I benefit in the long run from 
medical research, solidarity requires that I take a marginal privacy risk in 
making some of  my data, in an anonymised, encrypted format.  available for 
research (Wicks et all 2010, Laurie and Sethi 2013)). We have a similar 
benefit sharing here – everybody can become subject of a police 
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investigation, so in the long run, I share the benefits from a system that pools 
all our records and selects randomly a few of them each time a the modern 
equivalent of a Roman General asks is: Which one of you is Spartacus?. 
While it is possible to make this argument, absence of relevant case law 
makes it  difficult to assess if would withstand scrutiny by the courts. A legally 
safer option, and the one advocated here, is to ask for a generic consent from 
customers – are you willing to put your data in a pool if and when there are 
police inquiries in the future? This anticipatory consent  prevents time delays 
during investigations. Whether or not a sufficient number of customers would 
be willing to subscribe to such a scheme requires further, empirical research 
that should also address the question how adequate incentives could be 
designed.  We  noticed above the possible conflict between a conception of 
privacy as a public good and the notion of consent as the ultimate “trump” that 
can lead to individuals opting out of their legally guaranteed protection. Prima 
facie, the situation is different here. While enlightened self – interest is one 
reason people may have for allowing their data to be used as camouflage in 
an investigation, the aim ultimately is to protect a common good.  However, if 
solidarity alone is not sufficient to incentivise customer’s to protect in a mutual 
privacy protection scheme, other incentives could be found. One approach 
leaves this to the market – companies could have as their “selling point” that 
in a case of a police investigation, their customer’s anonymity would be 
protected. To encourage participation in the scheme, financial rewards could 
be  offered – as we noted above, people are  quite willing to accept privacy 
risks for even the most mundane of rewards such as shopping card loyalty 
points.  However, this would not only conflict with the normative concept of 
privacy advocated in  this paper, it would also be problematic from the 
perspective of companies offering this scheme – after all, they would more or 
less advertise as their unique selling point that they  are place where people 
shop who are likely to become part of a police investigation. Another 
possibility would be to require reciprocity in order to be protected  under the 
scheme – only those who “donate” their data will benefit if they themselves 
should come under the spotlight.  However, it is at least questionable if this 
approach would be legally sound – after all, if the police makes an inquiry 
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regarding someone who is not participant in the scheme, his data would be 
treated with less concern for privacy than possible in principle, which would 
arguably mean that the data controller, that is the company , is in violation of 
data protection law. This again reflects that ultimately privacy would be 
treated in such an approach as an alienable property, to be assigned away 
provide consent is given.  
The success of our proposal will therefore ultimately depend on empirical, 
social factors regarding risk assessment, solidarity and community loyalty. We 
noted above a slow but noticeable shift towards a greater concerns for 
privacy, and a greater willingness to prioritise it over investigative interests by 
the police. We can therefore expect uptake to  be highest in those 
environments where mutual solidarity and a feeling of belonging is strongest, 
for instance voluntary internet based associations such as the community of 
Wikipedia editors. Regardless, our proposal  should make a valuable 
contribution t the range of PET tools that are available. Where they reflected 
in the past the libertarian, individualistic  concept of privacy law, equipping 
individuals with protective tools that “build walls around them” within which 
they can keep their data safe. By contrast, our approach is a tool  for the 
emerging understanding  of privacy as a public good, where the protection of 
anonymity becomes a communal task, where we are strong only when united.   
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iICO in the United Kingdom, is a non‐departmental public body which reports directly to Parliament 
and is sponsored by the Ministry of Justice. It is the independent regulatory office dealing with the 
Data Protection Act 1998 and the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 
2003 across the UK. 
